This article will be a continuation of our research into self-justifying systems. It will introduce several new theorems and their applications. (One of these results will transform our previous infinite-sized self-verifying formalisms into tighter systems, with only a finite number of axioms.) It will explain how self-justification is useful, even when the Incompleteness Theorem limits its reach.
Introduction
Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem is a 2-part result. Its first half indicates no decision procedure can identify all the true statements of arithmetic. Its Second Incompleteness Theorem specifies sufficiently strong systems cannot verify their own consistency. Gödel was careful to insert the following caveat into his historic paper [13] , indicating a diluted form of Hilbert's Consistency Program could be successful: * : "It must be expressly noted that Proposition XI (e.g. the Second Incompleteness Theorem) represents no contradiction of the formalistic standpoint of Hilbert. For this standpoint presupposes only the existence of a consistency proof by finite means, and there might conceivably be finite proofs which cannot be stated in P (or in M or in A). "
Yourgrau has summarized, in detail, Gödel's considerations about this subject. Thus [46] indicated that "for several years" after [13] 's publication, Gödel "was cautious not to prejudge" whether some unusual formalism, different from Peano Arithmetic, might provide some type of proof of its own consistency. Likewise, the Stanford Encyclopedia [29] cites Gödel remarking that it was only after the evolution of Turing's formalism [31] that Gödel viewed the Second Incompleteness Theorem as being fundamentally ubiquitous.
Within the framework of these particular caveats, our papers [34] - [45] have discussed both generalizations and boundary-case exceptions for the Second Incompleteness Theorem. This research has had two facets because the meaning of partial exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem could be easily misunderstood, if their limitations are not also carefully scrutinized and recognized in meticulous detail.
The prior research was mostly mathematical in character, in that it sought to formalize several well-defined pairs (T, E), where T was a threshold sufficient for enacting the force of the Second Incompleteness Theorem and E was a closely related "boundary-case exception" that omitted some part of T 's formalism. Our goal in this paper will be different. It will seek to explore this subject from a more futuristic and epistemological perspective. It will characterize how far a theorem prover can traverse in understanding its own consistency before it reaches the inevetible barriers imposed by the Incompleteness Theorem. It will provide some partially sympathetic interpretations of Hilbert [16] 's 1925 statement * * , in a context where Gödel [13] established it, obviously, needed serious amendments: * * "Where else would reliability and truth be found if even mathematical thinking fails? The definitive nature of the infinite has become necessary, not merely for the special interests of individual sciences, but rather for the honor of human understanding itself."
In a context where Gödel's statement * was partially sympathetic with Hilbert's goals, even after Gödel had proven his incompleteness theorem, we will show how some logic systems can support a positive but-curtailed form of Hilbert's objectives. From both a theoretical and a pragmatic engineering-style perspective, our results will helpfully explain how to transform [34, 36, 41, 42, 44, 45] 's results about infinite-sized self-justifying systems into compact tableaux formalisms, containing only a strictly finite number of proper axioms.
These results will suggest that although the Second Incompleteness Theorem is extraordinarily robust and ubiquitous from an idealized purist mathematical perspective, some unusual axiom systems can possess a fragmentary knowledge of their consistency, when using definitions of consistency that are diluted but not immaterial.
This research was partially influenced by Goldstein's biography of Gödel [14] . It suggested that there ought to be some type of partial philosophical compromise available between the mathematical Platonism of Gödel and the logical positivism of Wittgenstein.
Also, the style of presentation in this article was influenced by a suggestion that Selmer Bringsjord had made several year ago [4] . It was that our research should be ideally broken into two stages, with its first phase focusing on purely mathematical results (similar to [34] - [45] 's treatment), and with its second stage exploring the epistemological and futuristic implications of such results. Bringsjord felt this carefully segmentized approach was useful so that the mathematical novelty of our results not be confused with its philosophical interpretation. (This is because the latter, quite naturally, lends itself much more easily to a quite complicated debate about the underlying epistemological implications of our mathematical formalism.)
In essence, the current paper will bring this second stage of our research to completion. It will explain the significance of logics that formalize a partial, although admittedly fragmentary, knowledge of their own consistency.
Format of our Presentation:
As much as is feasible, this article will be written in an informal style, so as to make it comprehensible to a broader audience. A reader who has, thus, mastered either say Enderton's or Mendelson's introductory logic textbooks [8, 23] , during a 1-semester course in logic, should be able follow its gist. Section 11 will suggest that our fragmentized approach for interpreting the goals of an applications-oriented engineering-styled subset of mathematics be called "Miniaturized Finitism".
The cautious-sounding adjective of "miniaturized" was attached to our formalism's name partly because it involves a curtailed notion of growth (e.g. see Sections 7 and 8) and also because the classic variants of the Second Incompleteness Theorem, obviously, have resolved at least 90% of the issues raised by Hilbert's Second Open Question.
Our discourse will focus, essentially, on the remaining, say, 10 % of the issues raised by Hilbert's year-1900 penetrating Second Open Question. Thus, we seek to offer a novel interpretation of Gödel's and Hilbert's 1925 and 1931 statements of * and * * , that will explain how human beings manage to gain the motivation and mental energy required for stimulating their cogitations, by having a type of automatic and psychologically unconscious access to an essentially very very miniaturized but-spontaneous self-appreciation of their own consistency.
Background Setting
Throughout this article, α will denote an axiom system, and d will denote a deduction method. An ordered pair (α, d) will be called Self Justifying when:
i one of α 's theorems will state that the deduction method d, applied to the system α, will produce a consistent set of theorems, and ii the axiom system α is in fact consistent.
For any (α, d) , it is easy to construct a second axiom system α d ⊇ α that satisfies Part-i of this definition. For instance, α d could consist of all of α 's axioms plus the following added sentence, that we call SelfRef(α, d) :
• There is no proof (using d's deduction method) of 0 = 1 from the union of the axiom system α with this sentence "SelfRef(α, d) " (looking at itself).
Kleene [19] discussed how to encode approximate analogs of SelfRef(α, d)'s self-referential statement. Each of Kleene, Rogers and Jeroslow [19, 27, 18] noted α d may, however, be inconsistent (despite SelfRef(α, d)'s assertion), thus causing it to violate Part-ii of self-justification's definition.
This problem arises in settings more general than Gödel's paradigm, where α was an extension of Peano Arithmetic. There are many settings where the Second Incompleteness Theorem does generalize [1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 13, 15, 17, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 32, 33, 37, 39, 42, 43] . Each such result formalizes a paradigm where self-justification is infeasible, due to a diagonalization issue.
Many logicians have, thus, hesitated to employ a SelfRef(α, d) axiom because α+SelfRef(α, d) is typically inconsistent 1 .
Our research explored special circumstances [36, 40, 41, 42] where it is feasible to construct self-justifying formalisms. These paradigms involved weakening the properties a system can prove about addition and/or multiplication (to avoid the preceding difficulties). To be more precise, let Add(x, y, z) and M ult(x, y, z) denote two 3-way predicates specifying x + y = z and x * y = z. Then a logic will be said to recognize successor, addition and multiplication as Total Functions iff it includes 1-3 as axioms.
∀x ∀y ∃z Add(x, y, z)
∀x ∀y ∃z M ult(x, y, z)
A logic system α will be called Type-M iff it contains (1) -(3) as axioms, Type-A iff it contains only (1) and (2) as axioms, and Type-S iff it contains only (1) as an axiom. Also a system is called Type-NS iff it contains none of these axioms. The significance of these constructs is explained by items (a) and (b):
a. The existence of Type-A systems that can recognize their consistency under semantic tableaux deduction was proven in [40] . Also, [42] demonstrated a large class of Type-NS systems can recognize their Hilbert consistency. (Many of these systems do prove all Peano Arithmetic's Π 1 theorems in a language that represents addition and multiplication as 3-way predicates.)
b. The above evasions of the Second Incompleteness Theorem are known to be near-maximal in a mathematical sense. This is because the combined work of Pudlák, Solovay, Nelson and
) will be inconsistent because a standard Gödel-like self-referencing construction will produce a proof of 0 = 1 from α d , even when α is consistent.
Wilkie-Paris [24, 26, 28, 33] As the reader exams the next several sections of this paper, he should also keep in mind that self-justifying systems that rely upon semantic tableaux as their primary deduction method is a different topic than formalisms using Herbrand-styled deduction. This fact was brought to our attention by private communications from L. A. Ko lodziejczyk [20] , who noted that
Herbrand styled systems can be exponentially slower than semantic tableaux systems under well-defined circumstances. Ko lodziejczyk's insightful observation enabled us to prove in [44] that Herbrand-styled self-justifying systems, unlike their semantic tableaux counterparts, could house a multiplication function symbol. Our results about mutliplication in [44] are clearly of mathematical interest, but they are not germane to our philosophical orientation in the current article because [44] 's formalism is able to house a multiplication function symbol only because of its exponential increase in inefficency. Thus, the current article will focus instead on uses of [40, 41] 's semantic tableaux styled formalisms because we suspect that their added efficiencies are likely to be of greater significance, from both a philosophical and engineering perspective, than our slower and more inefficient alternative mechanisms in [44] .
Defining Notation
The next two sections will summarize the properties of [40] 's IS D (A) axiom system. We will then outline how to refine [40] 's results in the remainder of this article.
A function F (a 1 , a 2 ...a j ) will be called Non-Growth iff it satisfies the general inequality
. Six examples of non-growth functions are Integer Subtraction (where x − y is defined to equal zero when x ≤ y ), Integer Division (where x ÷ y is defined to equal x when y = 0, and it equals ⌊ x/y ⌋ otherwise), M aximum(x, y),
Logarithm(x), Root(x, y) = ⌈ x 1/y ⌉ and Count(x, j) designating the number of "1" bits among
x's rightmost j bits.
The term U-Grounding Function referred in [40] to a set of eight operations, which included the preceding functions plus the growth operations of addition and Double(x) = x + x.
Our language L * was built out of these function symbols, the usual predicates of " = " and " ≤ " and the constant symbols "0" and "1".
In a context where t is any term in [40] 's language L * , the quantifiers stored in the wffs of ∀ v ≤ t Ψ(v) and ∃ v ≤ t Ψ(v) were called bounded quantifiers. Also, any formula in the U-Grounding language, all of whose quantifiers are bounded, was called a ∆ * 0 formula. The Π * n and Σ * n formulae were then defined by the usual rules that:
1. Every ∆ * 0 formula is considered to be a " Π * 0 " and also to be a " Σ * 0 " formula.
2. For n ≥ 1, a formula is called Π * n when it is encoded as ∀v 1 ... ∀v k Φ with Φ being Σ * n−1
3. Likewise, a formula is called Σ * n when it is encoded as ∀v 1 ... ∀v k Φ, with Φ being Π * n−1 .
Example 3.1 Although our language L * contains no multiplication function symbol, it does provide a means to encode multiplication as a 3-way relation ∆ * 0 formula, Mult(x, y, z), as is illustrated below:
Moreover, (5) illustrates how the commutative principle for multiplication can receive a Π * 1 encoding via the above Mult(x, y, z) predicate.
Similar methodologies may also encode multiplication's associative and distributive axioms as Π * 1 sentences. In general, all the Π 1 theorems in a conventional arithmetic language (that has multiplication symbols) can be translated into equivalent Π * 1 statements in our language L * .
This implies that the set of Π * 1 sentences is a quite rich class of statements and that no decision procedure is capable of separating all true from false Π * 1 statements.
Further Terminology: Most of our other notation will be similar to [40] 's terminology.
In addition to considering a definition of semantic tableaux deduction that is similar to either
Fitting's classic formalism [9] or a variant of it in [40] , we considered in [40] also a somewhat stronger technique, called Tab−k deduction. It is defined below and consists of a speeded-up version of a tableaux proof, which permits an analog of modus ponens for the limited cases of performing Gentzen-style deductive cuts on Π * k and Σ * k formulae.
where p i is a Semantic Tableaux proof of the theorem t i . Then H will be called a Tab-k Proof of a theorem T from the axiom system α iff T = t n and also:
1. Each of the "intermediately derived theorems" t 1 , t 2 , ... , t n−1 must have a complexity no greater than that of either a Π * k or Σ * k sentence.
2. Each axiom in p i 's proof either comes from α or is one of t 1 , t 2 , ... , t i−1 .
Thus, the preceding 2-part definition implies a Tab−k proof differs from Fitting's definition of a semantic tableaux proof [9] by allowing for an analog of a Gentzen cut-rule to be applied to intermediate results at the levels of Π * k and Σ * k formulae. A. For every axiom system A using L * 's U-Grounding language, [40] showed its IS D (A) formalism could prove all A's Π * 1 theorems and simultaneously verify its own Level-1 consistency when D corresponds to Tab−1 deduction.
B.
Two negative results that tightly complemented item A's positive result were exhibited in [35, 37, 39, 43] . The first was that [35, 37, 43] showed most systems are unable to verify their Level-0 consistency under semantic tableaux deduction when they included statement (3)'s "Type-M" axiom that multiplication is a total function. Moreover, [39] offered an alternate form of the Second Incompleteness Theorem that showed statement (2)'s far weaker Type-A systems are unable to verify their Level-0 consistency under Tab−2 deduction.
The contrast between these positive and negative results has led to our conjecture that sophisticated theorem provers are likely to eventually achieve a fragmentary part of the ambitions stated by Gödel and Hilbert in * and * * . This is because the question of whether a formalism can support an idealized Utopian conception of its own consistency is different from exploring the degrees to which theorem-provers can possess a fragmentary knowledge of their own consistency. Thus, the Incompleteness Theorem has demonstrated an Utopian idealized form of self-justification is unobtainable, but our on-going research has found some restrictive forms of self-knowledge are, indeed, feasible.
The IS D (A) Axiom System
In a context where D denotes any deductive method and A denotes any axiom system using L * 's U-Grounding language, IS D (A) was defined in [40] to be an axiomatic formalism capable of recognizing all of A's Π * 1 theorems and corroborating its own Level-1 consistency under deductive method D. It was defined in [40] to consist of the following four groups of axioms:
Group-Zero: Two of the Group-zero axioms will be Π * 1 statements defining the named constantsymbols,c 0 andc 1 , that designate the integers of 0 and 1. The third and fourth Group-zero axioms will be Π * 1 statements defining the two standard growth functions of addition and
The net effect of these axioms will be to set up a machinery to define any integer n ≥ 2 using fewer than 3 · ⌈ Log n ⌉ logic symbols.
Group-1:
This axiom group will consist of a finite set of Π * 1 sentences, denoted as F , which which can prove any ∆ * 0 sentence that holds true under the standard model of the natural numbers. (Any finite set of Π * 1 sentences F with this property may be used to define
Group-1, as [40] noted.)
Group-2: Let Φ denote Φ's Gödel Number, and HilbPrf A ( Φ , p) denote a ∆ * 0 formula indicating p is a Hilbert-styled proof of theorem Φ from axiom system A. For each Π * 1 sentence Φ, the Group-2 schema will contain an axiom of form (6) .
(Thus IS D (A) can
trivially prove all A's Π * 1 theorems.)
Group-3: The final part of the IS D (A) will consist of a single self-referencing Π * 1 sentence, indicating IS D (A) meets §3's criteria of being "Level-1 consistent" under deductive method D. It is, thus, the following declaration:
# There exists no two proof of both a Π * 1 sentence and its negation when D's deductive method is applied to an axiom system that consists of the union of the Group-0, 1 and 2 axioms with this sentence looking at itself.
One encoding of #, as a self-referencing Π * 1 sentence, was provided in [40] . Thus, sentence (7) will be a Π * 1 encoding for #, in a context where
indicating that b is a proof of a theorem a via deduction method D from IS D (A)'s axiom system, and where Pair(x, y) is a ∆ * 0 formula indicating x is the Gödel number of a Π * 1 sentence and y represents x 's negation.
Notation. An operation I( • ) that maps an initial axiom system A onto an alternate system I(A) will be called Consistency Preserving iff I(A) is consistent whenever all of A's axioms hold true under the standard model of the natural numbers. In this context, [40] demonstrated: We emphasize that the most difficult part of [40] 's result was neither the definition of its IS D (A)'s axiom system nor the Π * 1 fixed-point encoding of (7)'s Group-3 axiom. Instead, it was the confirming of Theorem 4.1 "Consistency Preservation" property.
The confirming of this property was subtle because its invariant breaks down when D is a deduction method only slightly stronger than either semantic tableaux or Definition 3.2's Tab−1 construct. Thus, the combined work of Pudlák and Solovay [26, 28] implied that Theorem 4.1's analog fails when D represents Hilbert deduction, and [39] showed its generalization would even fail when D represents Tab−2 deduction.
These difficulties occur because a Gödel-like diagonalization effect will automatically render IS D (A) inconsistent when D is too strong. Throughout this article, we will need to assure D does not reach a strength that produces such issues.
A Finitized Generalization of Theorem 4.1's Methodology
One awkward aspect of IS D (A) is that it employs an infinite number of different incarnations of sentence (6) will denote an axiom system, similar to IS D (A), except its Group-2 scheme will employ β 's set of axioms, instead of using an infinite number of applications of statement (6) 
Now, let Pair(t, g) denote a ∆ * 0 formula that specifies t is the Gödel number of a Π * 1 statement and g is the Σ * 1 formula which is its negation. Then our notation implies that t is a true Π * 1 statement if and only if (10) holds true:
Thus if Test 0 (t, x) denotes the ∆ * 0 formula of " 
is the i−th element in this list of kernels and if Ψ is an arbitrary Π * 1 sentence, then Ψ 's i-th Kernel Image will be the following Π * 1 sentence:
Example 5.6 The combination of Definitions 5.3 and 5.5 indicates that there is a subtle relationship between a sentence Ψ and its i−th Kernel Image. This is because Definition 5.3
indicates that Peano Arithmetic does prove the invariant (8) , indicating that Ψ is equivalent to its its i−th Kernel Image. However, a weak axiom system can be plausibly uncertain about whether this equivalence holds.
Thus if a weak axiom system proves statement (11) (rather than Ψ itself), then it may not be able to equate these two results. This problem will apply to Theorem 5.7's formalism. However, Theorem 5.7 will be still of much interest because §6 will illustrate a generalized methodology that overcomes many of Theorem 5.7's limitations. Proof Sketch: Our justification of Theorem 5.7 will use the following notation:
1. Check(t) will denote a ∆ * 0 formula that produces a Boolean value of True when t represents the Gödel number of a Π * 1 sentence.
2. HilbPrf A (t, q) will denote a ∆ * 0 formula that indicates q is a Hilbert-style proof of the theorem t from axiom system A .
3. For any kernelized Test i (t, x) formula, the symbol GlobSim i will then denote (12)'s Π * 1 sentence. (It will be called A's i−th "Global Simulation Sentence".)
In this notation, the requirements of Theorem 5. 
Hence for each of the infinite number of Π * 1 theorems that A proves, the above defined formalism will prove a matching statement that corresponds to the i−th kernelized image of each such proven theorem.
6 Pragmatic L-Fold Generalizations of Theorem 5.7
Theorem 5.7 is of interest because every axiom system A will have its formalism IS
prove the i−th kernelized image of every Π * 1 theorem that A proves. This fact is helpful because (8)'s invariance holds for all Π * 1 sentences. Moreover, our "U-Grounded" Π * 1 sentences capture all Conventional Arithmetic's crucial Π 1 information because they can view multiplication as a 3-way ∆ * 0 predicate Mult(x, y, z) via (14)'s encoding of this predicate.
[
One difficulty with the IS Our conjecture is that a goodly number of issues concerning some logic-based engineering applications, called say E, will have convenient solutions via self-justifying axiom systems that follow the strategy outlined in the preceding paragraph. Thus, we are suggesting that if β is a large-but-finite set of axioms, that consists of L copies of (12) Remark 6.1 The preceding discussion was not meant to overlook the fact that the Second Incompleteness Theorem is a robust result, that will preclude self-justifying systems from recognizing their own consistency under strong definitions of consistency (as was discussed by Sections 2 and 3). Our suggestion, however, is that computers are becoming so powerful, in both speed and memory size as the 21st century is progressing, that there likely will emerge engineering-style applications E that will benefit from IS # D (β)'s self-referencing formalisms when a large-but-finite-sized β is delicately chosen. (Moreover, it is of interest to speculate about whether such computers can, at least partially, imitate a human's gut instinctive at least partial confidence 3 in his own consistency.)
Remark 6.2 The next three sections will further amplify on the preceding themes. They will make it unequivocally clear that the Second Incompleteness Theorem is too powerful a result for any partial exception to overcome its formalism, in an entire and full sense. Yet at the same time, they will suggest that some aspects of the statements * and * * , by Gödel and Hilbert, did correctly foresee that a logical system can, at least, bolster a partial limited-style appreciation of its own consistency.
Comparing the Properties of Type-M and Type-A Formalisms
Let us recall that axioms (1)-(3) indicated that Type-A systems differ from Type-M formalisms by treating Multiplication as a 3-way relation (rather than as a total function). For the sake of accurately characterizing what our systems can and cannot do, we have described our results as being fringe-like exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem from the perspective of an Utopian view of Mathematics, while perhaps being more significant results from an engineeringstyle perspective of knowledge. Our goal in this section will be to amplify upon this perspective by taking a closer look at Type-A and Type-M formalisms.
to have some finite number of say M additional general purpose Π * 1 axioms added to β, so as to enhance the power and increase the efficiency of IS # D (β). 3 While human beings presumably do not have a fully robust conficence in their own consistency. the footnoted sentence refers to the fact that they certainly have a sufficient partial confidence of such to, at least, reach the threshold needed for motivating themselves to cogitate.
During our discussion, x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , ... and y 0 , y 1 , y 2 , ... will denote the sequences defined by the identifies of:
These sequences represent the growth rates that are produced, respectively, by the axioms (2) and (3), that specify addition and multiplication are total functions.
Equations (15)- (17) imply y n = 2 2 n and x n = 2 n+1 . Thus, the y 0 , y 1 , y 2 , ... sequence will grow at a much faster rate than the x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , ... sequence. (This is because y n 's binary encoding will have an Log(y n ) = 2 n length while x n 's binary encoding will have a much smaller length of size Log(x n ) = n + 1. )
Our prior papers noted that the difference between these growth rates was the reason that [35, 37, 43] showed all natural Type-M systems, recognizing integer-multiplication as a total function, were unable to recognize their tableaux-styled consistency -while [34, 36, 40] showed some Type-A systems could simultaneously prove all Peano Arithmetic Π * 1 theorems and corroborate their own tableaux consistency. Their gist was that a Gödel-like diagonalization argument, which causes an axiom system to become inconsistent as soon as it proves a theorem affirming its own tableaux consistency, stems from the exponential growth in the series y 0 , y 1 , y 2 , ... . (In other words, this growth facilitates an intense amount of self-referencing, using the identity Log(y n ) ∼ = 2 n , that will invoke the force of Gödel's seminal diagonalization machinery.)
These issues do raise the following question about proofs of the Second Incompleteness Theorems:
• How natural are exponentially growing sequences analogous to y 0 , y 1 , y 2 , ..., whose n−th member requires more than 2 n bits to encode, when such encodings exceed the number of atoms in the universe if simply n > 100 ? Does the employment of such a sequence, for corroborating the Second Incompleteness Effect, suggest that this formalism is relying upon partially artificial constructs?
We will not attempt to derive a Yes-or-No answer to Question • because it is one of those epistemological questions that can be debated endlessly. Our point is that • probably does not require a definitive positive or negative answer because both perspectives are useful.
Thus, the theoretical existence of a sequence integers of y 0 , y 1 , y 2 , ..., whose binary encodings are doubling in length, is tempting from the perspective of an Utopian view of mathematics, while awkward from an engineering styled perspective. We therefore ask: "Why not be tolerant of both perspectives? "
One virtue of this tolerance is it ushers in a greater understanding of the statements * and * * that Gödel and Hilbert made during the first third of the 20th century. This is because the Incompleteness Theorem demonstrates no formalism can display an understanding of its own consistency in an idealized Utopian sense. On the other hand, §6 suggested these remarks by Gödel and Hilbert might receive more sympathetic interpretations, if one sought to explore such questions from a less ambitious almost engineering-style perspective.
Our main thesis is supported by a theorem from [41] . It indicated that semantic tableaux variations of self-justifying systems have no difficulty in recognizing that an infinitized generalization of a computer's floating point multiplication (with rounding) is a total function. The latter differs from integer-multiplication, by not having its output become double the length of its input when a number is multiplied by itself. Thus, the intuitive reason that [41] 's multiplicationwith-rounding operation is compatible with self-justification is because it avoids the inexorable exponential growth, associated with Equation (17)'s sequence y 0 , y 1 , y 2 , ... . Also, the Theorem 7.1 below indicates our self-justifying system can recognize a doubleprecision variant of integer multiplication as a total function. 
A Different Type of Evidence Supporting Our Thesis
Let us recall that Pudlák and Solovay [26, 28] observed that essentially all Type-S systems, containing merely statement (1) During our discussion G i (v) will denote the scalar-multiplication operation that maps an integer v onto 2 2 i · v . Also, Υ i will denote the statement, in the U-Grounding language, that declares that G i is a total function. Our paper [39] had noted that Υ i can receive a Π * 2 encoding. It is also obvious that G i satisfies the identity:
It was noted in [39] that this identity implies one can construct an axiom system β, comprised of solely Π * 1 sentences, where a semantic tableaux proof can establish Υ i+1 from β + Υ i in a constant number of steps. This implies, in turn, that a Tab−2 proof from β will require no more that O(n) steps to prove Υ n (when it uses the obvious n-step process to confirm in chronological
These observations are significant because G n (1) = 2 2 n . Thus, [39] showed a Tab−2 proof from β can verify in O(n) steps that this integer exists.
This example is helpful because it illustrates that the difference between the growth rates, under proofs using Definition 3.2's Tab−1 and Tab−2 deductive methodologies, is analogous to the differing growth speeds of the sequences x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , ... and y 0 , y 1 , y 2 , ... from Equations (15)- (17). Thus once again, the faster growth-rate has the side-effect of triggering off the force of the Second Incompleteness Theorem (e.g. see [39] ).
This analogy suggests that the Second Incompleteness Theorem has different implications from the perspectives of Utopian and engineering theories about the intended applications of mathematics. Thus, a Utopian may possibly be comfortable with a perspective, that contemplates sequences y 0 , y 1 , y 2 , ... with elements growing in length at an exponential speed, but many engineers may be suspicious of such growths.
A hard-core engineer, in contrast, might surmise that the inability of self-justifying formalisms to be compatible with Definition 3.2's Tab−2 deduction is not as disturbing as it might initially appear to be. This is because Tab−2 differs from Tab−1 deduction by producing growth rates that are so sharp that their material realization has no analog in the everyday mechanical reality that is the focus of an engineer's interest.
Our personal preference is for a perspective lying half-way between that of an Utopian mathematician and a hard-nosed engineer. Its dualistic approach suggests some form of half-way agreement with the the goals of Hilbert's consistency program in * * . (This is the maximal type of agreement with Hilbert's goals that is, obviously, feasible because no more than a curtailed form of the objectives of his consistency program is plainly realistic.)
Further Related Improvements
An added point is that there are many types of self-justifying systems available, with some being better suited for engineering environments than others.
For instance, our initial 1993 paper [34] employed a Group-3 "I am consistent" axiom that was much weaker than the current specimen. The distinction was that [34] 's self-consistency declaration excluded merely the existence of a semantic tableaux proof of 0 = 1 from itself, while the sentence (7) is more elaborate because it excludes the existence of simultaneous proofs of a Π * 1 theorem and its negation.
This distinction is significant because it implies that each time our self-justifying systems S prove a Π * 1 or Σ * 1 theorem Φ , they will know it is fruitless to search for a proof of the negation of Φ's statement 4 .
Ideally, one would like to additionally develop self-justifying systems S that could corroborate the validity of (19)'s reflection principle for all sentences Φ, as well.
Löb's Theorem establishes, however, that all axiom systems S, containing the strength of Peano Arithmetic, are able to prove (19)'s invariant only in the degenerate case where they prove Φ itself. Also, the Theorem 7.2 from [36] showed essentially all axiom systems, weaker than Peano Arithmetic, are unable to prove (19) for all Π * 1 sentences Φ simultaneously. Theorem 9.1's reflection principle is thus pleasing: 4 From at least an engineer's hard-nosed perspective, this fact is very helpful because it will allow an automated theorem prover to imitate, for at least Π * 1 and Σ * 1 sentences, the common-sense human presumption that the discovery of a proof a theorem Φ leads to the time-saving conclusion that it is unnecessary to search for a proof of ¬ Φ.
1. Verify that Tab−1 deduction supports the following analog of (19)'s self-reflection principle under S for any ∆ * 0 and Σ * 1 sentences Φ :
2. Verify (21)'s more general "root-diluted" reflection principle for S whenever θ is Σ * 1 and Φ is a Π * 2 sentence of the form " ∀u 1 ...∀u n θ(u 1 ...u n ) ".
Theorem 9.1 is stronger than Theorems 4.1 and 5.7 because of its reflection principles. Its proof is a generalization of related reflection princibles used in [36] . It is summarized in Appendix B. Theorem 9.1 reinforces our theme about how exceptions to the Second Incompleteness
Theorem may appear to be minor from the perspective of an Utopian view of mathematics, while being significant from an engineering standpoint. This is because:
A. The ability of Theorem 9. 10 "Wir müssen wissen: wir werden wissen"
In summary, our research has been largely motivated by the approximate conjecture that human beings acquire the needed mental energy and will-power for motivating their time-consuming cogitations only via the human mind owning, at least in a weak sense, some type of quasiautomatic and possibly unconscious appreciation of its own consistency.
Two of Hilbert's famous often-quoted statements suggest that he would agree, at least par- Conditions [17, 23] . * * * "We must know: we will know"
The presumable reason that Hilbert believed that, at least, some diluted version of his consistency program would ultimately succeed is because it adamantly defies common sense to explain how a human mind can motivate itself to cogitate, without possessing some at least diluted form of knowledge and faith in its own consistency.
Thus, Hilbert clinged to the belief that some at least diluted version of his consistency program would ultimately succeed, as * * * had hinted 5 . Moreover, a word-by-word reading of * * * finds it openly declaring some mysterious object XYZ "must" exist, whose exact nature (and even defining name) it is deliberately vague about (despite the fact that Hilbert tells us that "we must know" about it).
The prior nine sections of the current article, as well as our earlier research in [34] - [45] ,
were largely devoted to defining this elusive object XYZ (that underlines a human's instinctive faith in his own processes but which is decisively awkward to describe). Part of the reason that
Hilbert's desired XYZ is so tenderly elusive is that §7 has documented that systems, recognizing even their own tiny miniaturized tableaux consistency, cannot corroborate the assumption that multiplication is a total function, and §8 has formalized how Type-A axiom systems are also unable to recognize their own consistency under a Tab−2 generalization of semantic tableaux deduction.
These facts certainly illustrate that a formalism cannot recognize its own consistency in an idealized Utopian sense, and one must thus approach this subject matter with daring and ginger amounts of caution.
Within this context, the gist of our Sections 7 and 8 was that Type-A systems that recognize their own consistency under Tab−1 deduction are not, actually, quite as weak as they might initially appear. This is because they avoid the super-exponential growth of Equation (17)'s y 0 , y 1 , y 2 , ... series, whose growth is inscrutable from a hard-nosed engineering style perspective.
Thus, if one confines one's attention onto Equation (16) to be no coincidence that Hilbert, who had a knack for formulating many famous often-quoted phrases, would have the motto of his never-terminated consistency program inscribed as the final memorial on his tombstone.
The thesis, advanced in this article, is subtle because there are many different kinds of "I am consistent" statements that can be used by the Group-3 components of our self-justifying axiom systems. Some of these formalisms have the advantages of being preferable from a pedagogic perspective. This is because a formalism that merely declares the non-existence of a semantic tableaux proof of 0 = 1 from itself is relatively easy to analyze (such as the initial 1993 version of a self-justifying axiom system that was proposed in [34] 
Miniaturized Finitism
The phrase "Miniaturized Finitism" should, perhaps, be employed to describe the type of agenda for mathematics that this article is advocating. The cautious-sounding adjective of "miniaturized" was attached to this name because one should readily admit that there is an indisputably miniaturized and quite humble aspect to any school of mathematics that drops the assumption that multiplication is a total function and which also replaces an unqualified modus ponens rule with Definition 3.2's more tender Tab−1 variant of deduction.
The second word "Finitism", on the other hand, was attached to this name because it partially vindicates the "finistic" presumption of Gödel and Hilbert, specified in statements * and * * , that it should be feasible to formalize how Thinking Beings do conceptualize at Some may critically view our particular form of self-justification as an essentially dwarfedsized theory, which uses an argument resting on a tiny "miniaturized" notion of growth to explain how Thinking Beings are able to muster an at least partial appreciation of their own consistency. In such a context, it is pleasing to reply that Gödel was famous for telling Einstein that he did dearly love dwarfs: For instance, Dawson [7] and Goldstein [14] recall how Gödel "was espeically fond of Disney films" and attended "at least three" repeated screenings of "Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs". Likewise, Yourgrau [46] recites Gödel telling Einstein that the 6 Researchers who happen to examine Willard's research since 1990 will curiously notice that the philosophy of the footnoted sentence has been central to this research since 1990. Thus, Fredman-Willard [10, 11] published in that year a boundary-case exception to the widely accepted textbook lower bound for sorting and searching that would later become the chronologically first among six items listed in the Mathematics and Computer Science section of the National Science Foundation's 1991 Annual Report. And so beginning with [34] 's initial 1993 theorem about self verification, Willard's on-going research into Logic was based on the presumption that other types of widely-accepted enticing textbook results would be found, upon careful inspection, ultimately to admit partial, although certainly weak, forms of very tightly defined boundary-case exceptions.
tale of the seven dwarfs was, actually, his favorite movie because it "presents the world as it should be and as if it had meaning".
Leaving aside the poetry of the preceding metaphor about how Gödel was enamored by miniaturized-sized objects such as dwarfs, our main points are that both Gödel and Hilbert specified in statements * and * * that they felt some type of self-justification would be feasible.
Thus, the name "Miniaturized Finitism", has its adjective "miniaturized" nicely capturing the fact that only a discernible fractional (but indeed quite non-trivial) part of the initial goals of Hilbert's consistency program are achievable.
Summary Statement
As a final note, it is useful to recall that the opening chapter of this article indicated the current report would have different goals than our earlier papers.
The distinction was that our earlier work consisted of papers employing mostly a mathematical gendre, focusing on generalizations and boundary-case exceptions for the Second Incompleteness Theorem. The emphasis in the current report was different because it sought to focus on interpreting the meaning of the statements * , * * and * * * of Gödel and Hilbert, rather than centering around the mathematics of our new formalisms. (Our current paper presented new theorems only when they were necessary to formalize its epistemological overview.)
The reason for the current article's different emphasis is that we anticipate that this second topic should grow in significance, as the 21st century progresses. This is mostly because digital computers have grown in importance during the last seventy years and have essentially doubled in memory size every 2 years at the unabated exponential rate that Moore's Law Moore's Law has predicted.
This fact about the burgeoning growth in memory size for digital computers in turn raises the questions about their other capacities. In particular, it raises the question of whether such computers will have the ability to in some sense to recognize their own consistency, which ability humans seem to possess in some partial, though not full sense.
Regarding the last point, our speculations are not intended to suggest that humans (or computers) will be able to corroborate their own consistency in a robust sense. It is obvious that the Second Incompleteness Theorem has established that such a prospect is hopeless. The point is, however, that humans have been able to intuitively appreciate their own consistency in some type of quasi-reasonable sense -in order to motivate themselves to gain the mental energy and will power to cogitate.
The advance of the digital computer during the 21st century will, thus, inevitably raise the question about how computers can maintain, likewise, some type of timid-but-well-defined appreciation of their own consistency. We suspect this will cause the statements * , * * and * * * of Gödel and Hilbert to be reviewed often, again, in the future (and ultimately to gain some form of partial-although-not-full reinforcement).
This point is delicately subtle because there is no question that the Second Incompleteness Theorem will always be remembered as the greatest of all the achievements in the modern advancement of Logic. Yet, this fact should not preclude the Second Incompleteness Theorem as being seen as analogous to many other mathematical discoveries, in that most great mathematical results typically permit for the existence of some types of well-defined forms of boundary-case exceptions.
Thus along the lines that Gödel and Hilbert had approximately predicted, in especially their first and third statements of * and * * * , it is not surprising that there exists certain types of unconventionally framed axiom systems that possess a form of diluted but not fully immaterial knowledge about their own self-consistency.
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An axiom system S will be said to own a "tangible understanding" of its reflection properties under deduction method D iff it can corroborate (23) for every sentence Φ.
The Theorem 6.1 of [36] showed that every consistent axiom system A can be mapped onto a system S that can prove all A's Π * 1 theorems, while verifying (23)'s reflection principle when D denotes semantic tableaux deduction.
Moreover, it is possible to hybridize [36] 's result with Theorem 5.7's methodology to establish that more advanced versions of S can verify (23) for the cases where 1) D denotes the more elaborate Tab−1 (rather than semantic tableaux) deduction method, 2) S can possess, for any fixed i, a finite-sized Group-2 scheme that enables it to prove the i−th kernelized image of each Π * 1 theorem of A, and 3) S can verify its own Level-1 consistency.
Such an argument will corroborate Theorem 9.1's claims about (20) and (21) We will not provide more details concerning Theorem 9.1's proof here because the overall structure of its justification is analogous to [36] 's corroboration of its "TangRoot" reflection principle. It is desirable to keep this technical report's mathematical discussion as brief as possible, so that our discourse can focus, instead, on an epistemological interpretation of the significance of self justification.
